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Antecedents of support for social media content moderation and
platform regulation: the role of presumed effects on self and others
Martin J. Riedl, Kelsey N. Whipple, and Ryan Wallace
Abstract
This study examines support for regulation of and by platforms and provides insights into public
perceptions of platform governance. While much of the public discourse surrounding platforms
evolves at a policy level between think tanks, journalists, academics and political actors, little
attention is paid to how people think about regulation of and by platforms. Through a
representative survey study of U.S. internet users (N = 1,022), we explore antecedents of support
for social media content moderation by platforms, as well as for regulation of social media
platforms by the government. We connect these findings to presumed effects on self (PME1) and
others (PME3), concepts that lie at the core of third-person effect (TPE) and influence of presumed
influence (IPI) scholarship. We identify third-person perceptions for social media content:
Perceived negative effects are stronger for others than for oneself. A first-person perception
operates on the platform level: The beneficial effects of social media platforms are perceived to
be stronger for the self than for society. At the behavioral level, we identify age, education,
opposition to censorship, and perceived negative effects of social media content on others (PME3)
as significant predictors of support for content moderation. Concerning support for regulation of
platforms by the government, we find significant effects of opposition to censorship, perceived
intentional censorship, frequency of social media use, and trust in platforms. We argue that
stakeholders involved in platform governance must take more seriously the attitudes of their
constituents.
Keywords: content moderation, social media, platform regulation, third-person effect, survey, free
speech
Introduction
Content moderation and platform regulation are having a moment. While just a few years ago the
profession of content moderators was largely unknown to the public, profiles in prominent news
outlets (e.g., A. Chen, 2017) have raised awareness for this critical digital labor issue. At the
same time, congressional hearings on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a U.S.
law regulating the liability of internet platforms (Medeiros, 2017), as well as hearings in which
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg provided testimony on Capitol Hill, have thrust social media
platforms to the front and center of ongoing political debate.
The spotlight on platform regulation, perceived biases of social media platforms (Allen &
VandeHei, 2019), and the ways in which platforms are enmeshed in major social events
including elections (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017) have exposed the complicated relationships
between platforms and society. Today, people question how platforms govern online content
production and distribution. The Pew Research Center reports that about 70% of Americans
think social media platforms likely censor political viewpoints (Smith, 2018). Content
takedowns, however, are foremost a risk-mitigation project: Certain types of content, such as
0
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terrorist propaganda, child pornography, or hate speech are more harmful to society than others.
Lawmakers and activists alike are calling for platforms to remove such harmful content with
increased speed and transparency.
Ongoing discussions about platform governance (Gorwa, 2019) are valuable; however, they
often ignore critical questions about what users and nonusers think. This study explores
antecedents of support for regulation by and of platforms in light of perceived effects of social
media in society from an audience perspective.
Through a representative, cross-sectional survey study of the United States internet population
(N = 1,022), we explore these issues in two critical ways: First, we investigate and survey factors
impacting support for content moderation by platforms and presumed effects of social media
content on the self vis-à-vis other people. Second, we explore factors impacting support for
increased government regulation for platforms, and presumed effects related to the impact of
platforms on society vis-à-vis the self. In doing so, we explore the perceptual claims of the thirdperson effect (TPE). Our inquiry is informed by scholarship on TPE and the influence of
presumed influence (IPI) framework, as well as more recent scholarship emphasizing the
importance of considering the impact of perceived effects on self (PME1) vis-à-vis perceived
effects on others (PME3) as independent variables.
Literature Review
Content moderation as regulation by platforms
Content moderation relates to “governance mechanisms that structure participation in a
community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse [italics in original]” (Grimmelmann,
2015, p. 47). Moderation is contingent on user-generated content, or UGC, and often outsourced
and opaque by design (Roberts, 2019). UGC can be moderated ex-ante, or ex-post (Klonick,
2017), the latter of which can be done by moderation teams wading through forums, or by
responding to audience members flagging content (Naab et al., 2018). Moderation is further
enabled by computational means, for example through machine learning and filtering (Myers
West, 2018). Moderation can also be a volunteer activity; Matias (2019) describes content
moderation that is carried out by volunteers as a type of civic labor. Content moderation is one of
the most pervasive functions of social media platforms, as it is instrumental to shaping the
content regimes that users encounter. Gillespie (2018) describes moderation as the main
commodity platforms offer. Content moderation also confronts societies with important
questions about civic liberties, such to what extent citizens want private actors like social media
platforms to police content, and how freedom of expression factors into content governance
regimes. In the United States, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act governs the
liability of platforms (Medeiros, 2017) and makes it possible for platforms to voluntarily conduct
moderation. When content moderation is framed as regulation, law scholars such as Klonick
(2017) refer to platforms with terms such as the new governors. The underlying assumption of
moderation is that some content is considered to be detrimental to users. To explore attitudes and
perceptions surrounding social media content and moderation, we turn our attention to
perceptions of such effects on self (PME1) as well as perceived effects on others (PME3), and
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two frameworks associated with these perceptions: The third-person effect (TPE) and the
influence of presumed influence (IPI) model.
Third-person effect, presumed influence on self and others, and social media
The third-person effect (TPE) of communication arises when an individual exposed to a mass
media message perceives that message as being more impactful or persuasive to others than to
him or herself (Davison, 1983). The third-person effect also predicts that people make decisions
based on their assumptions of media impact (Gunther, 1991). For example, they might support
restricting or censoring media messages (Salwen & Dupagne, 1999) to protect others who might
be influenced. Researchers have examined the third-person effect in the context of key domains
of online content and content moderation, including internet pornography (Lee & Tamborini,
2005; Lo & Wei, 2002), Facebook (Paradise & Sullivan, 2012; Tsay-Vogel, 2016), and online
comments (Chen & Ng, 2016). More recently, researchers have extended the concept to the
domain of social media platforms. For example, Betts et al. (2019) found that people perceive
others as more likely to experience cyber bullying than themselves. In the domain of fake news,
that is, news propagating false information, stronger third-person perceptions have been shown
to lead to lower support for regulation (Jang & Kim, 2018). Tsay-Vogel (2016) tested a
perceived Facebook effect from a third-person perspective and confirmed that people perceive
Facebook as affecting others more than themselves. However, her measurement conflates
content effects and platform effects, issues we are keen to distinguish in this present study.
The literature on TPE propagates two core hypotheses: The first one assumes that there is a
perceptual difference between how a person thinks they might be affected by media content
versus how others might be. This perceptual difference is widely established and so is its reverse,
called a first-person effect, which appears, “[w]hen a presumed media effect is socially
desirable” (Baek et al., 2019, p. 303). While a large majority of research focused on perceptions
of undesirable content, first-person perceptions are important to consider when contemplating
socially desirable content, or, as this study proposes, infrastructures such as social media
platforms. The second hypothesis of TPE posits that the difference between perceived effects on
others (PME3) and on self (PME1) impacts support for regulation – a behavioral claim that has
been contested (Chung & Moon, 2016). In line with the established perceptual hypothesis, we
posit:
H1. Participants will perceive the negative effects of social media content to be stronger
for others than for themselves.
The third-person effect has long been examined alongside censorship (Davison, 1983). Using it,
censors and those who support censorship of some type of media content or another can claim
that they are acting to protect the interests of third parties who are more susceptible to media
messages than they are (Davison, 1983; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999). Concerning the behavioral
hypothesis, researchers have found inconclusive connections between third-person effects and
support for regulation of Facebook (Paradise & Sullivan, 2012), whereas other research related
to sexual content has found strong connections between third-person effects and support for
censorship (Chia et al., 2006).

2

The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in
Information, Communication & Society (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1874040

More recently, researchers including Jang and Kim (2018) have not found a link between thirdperson effects and support for government regulation. Cheng and Chen (2020) suggest that this
lack of relationship may be based on social media users’ own wariness of government regulation.
In this case, examining the influence of presumed influence (IPI; Gunther & Storey, 2003) on
others may be more useful in understanding attitudes toward regulation. Indeed, looking more
closely at users’ presumptions of the negative effect of media on others — rather than on the
difference between self and others — shows a clearer link to support of regulation (Cheng &
Chen, 2020; Gunther, 1991). Baek et al. (2019) found that people were more likely to support
regulation as an outcome when they believed that fake news had an influence on both other
people and themselves. Chung and Moon (2016) found that the perception that others are
influenced (PME3) is a stronger predictor for support of censorship than the perception that
oneself is influenced (PME1).
Another strand of research, coined the diamond method (Schmierbach et al., 2011, Neuwirth &
Frederick, 2002) proposes exploring a second-person effect (SPE), which relates to a summative
term of perceived effects on self and others (PME1 + PME3) (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002; Sun
et al., 2008). This is of interest because such a formula “controls for the effects of general
perceptions of strong media effects” (Schmierbach et al., 2011, p. 311), and because secondperson perceptions have been found to be strong predictors of behavior (Neuwirth & Frederick,
2002).
When considering explanations for these effects, proposed underlying psychological mechanisms
generally fall into one of two categories: those that are cognition-based and those that are
motivation-based (Nan, 2007). Cognitive explanations such as Gunther and Mundy’s (1993)
biased optimism build on the human tendency to perceive the world through a dichotomous and
often self-serving lens—one that separates the self and others within the mind. Alternatively,
popular motivational explanations (Meirick, 2005) suggest that individuals self-enhance to
perceive themselves as less vulnerable to media effects.
We root our study in a conceptualization that assumes social media use entails serendipitous and
unavoidable exposure to what Jack (2019) refers to as wicked content, which is “recognizably
problematic, even if said content’s veracity, its provenance, and the intent with which it was
distributed, are uncertain” (p. 436). Just how problematic content may be lies in the eye of the
beholder, though possibilities to imagine what could constitute bad, wicked, or otherwise
harmful content are endless and leave ample room to platforms for intervention and moderation.
Research documents the powerful role that hate speech (e.g., Pohjonen, 2019), online incivility
(e.g., G. M. Chen, 2017) and disinformation or propaganda (e.g., Woolley & Howard, 2018) can
play in online spaces, rendering considerations of harm on both personal and societal levels.
Exposure to incivility, for instance, can lead to emotional exhaustion (Riedl et al., 2020), and
emotional distress (Lee-Won et al., 2019). Incivility can also lead to anger when someone’s ingroup is targeted (Gervais, 2015).
Research indicates that 45% of Americans think that technology companies have a
“responsibility to protect the public from objectionable content” (Ballard, 2019, n. p.). At the
same time, 41% of Americans think that “[r]removing user-created content from social media
sites is suppressing free speech” (Ballard, 2019, n. p.).
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Given how social media platforms are implicated in interference in democratic elections in the
U.S. and abroad and the strategic spread of misinformation internationally, the responsibility of
tech companies stretches well beyond protecting the public from objectionable content (e.g.,
Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Social media platforms, through their user agreements and content
moderation, largely govern what users can do and say on their platforms. However, while
significant interest has recently concentrated on structural questions of governance, how
platforms shape discourse, and what content should be freely shared, less attention is paid to user
perceptions. Because the salience of particular content on social media may not only shape what
audiences think but can also actively shape the public agenda, moderation of these spaces is both
important and highly contested. Given this reality, we aim to explore which factors, alongside
PME1 and PME3, impact support for social media content moderation. Because support for
content moderation, as well as free speech concerns tethered to content moderation by platforms,
are related to political ideology (Ballard, 2019), we include as variables political attitudes and
support for free speech. Other domains of interest include general attitudes and behaviors toward
platforms that may impact support for content moderation, such as frequency of social media
use, pre-existing trust in platforms, ethical evaluations of platforms, and beliefs about whether
platforms intentionally censor viewpoints. Anticipating that demographics will also factor into
support for social media content moderation, we ask the following:
RQ1. What are the strongest predictors of support for social media content moderation?
Platforms and support for governmental regulation
In the United States, 46% of the internet population gets news from social media (Newman et al.,
2019). According to the Pew Research Center (2019), 70% of Americans use social media, a
drastic increase from 5% in 2005. The term platform describes a technology corporation offering
services and communication infrastructure to users (Gillespie, 2010; Helmond, 2015). Platforms
depend upon attention and engagement, both of which are crucial for advertising. When
platforms create offerings that impact how the internet evolves, they become the infrastructure
on which others rely. As such, platform users are inevitably “susceptible to processes of
capitalisation and proprietary enclosure” (Mackenzie, 2019, p. 2003). As Helmond (2015)
argues, the key determinants of platforms are programmability and structuring through
application programming interfaces (APIs).
Scholars regularly contemplate the affordances that social platforms provide their users. In this
vein, imagined affordance is a “term that helps scholars to reflect technological environments’
material qualities that mediate affective experiences” (Nagy & Neff, 2015, p. 2). In this vein, we
are interested in how users perceive the benign effects of social media platforms. While literature
typically suggests stronger effects on others than on the self, we anticipate the opposite – a firstperson perception – would be the case for beneficial effects of platforms. We argue this might be
for three reasons: First, in line with the bias the Dunning-Kruger effect posits – namely that
people overestimate their own cognitive skills (Dunning, 2011) – we suggest that one’s
individual relationship to technology and the direct benefits expected from technology might be
easier to grasp and heuristically process than the role of technology and its beneficial effects on
society writ large. Second, because technology conveys the myth of a steady increase in
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convenience for users (Postman, 1993), we assume that presumed influence on self will be
stronger – people perceiving social media platforms as having a bigger beneficial effect – than
presumed influence on others. Third, we posit that the proposition of social desirability of media
content leading to first-person effects (Golan & Day, 2008) extends beyond the context of
content and is also applicable to platforms themselves. A Pew Research Center survey points
into this direction: While 36% of Americans say that tech companies impact on society has been
more bad than good, 63% think the opposite (Smith, 2018). And while 24% think the impact on
the self has been more bad than good, 74% believe the opposite (Smith, 2018). Therefore, we
posit the following hypothesis:
H2. Participants will perceive stronger beneficial effects of social media platforms on
themselves than on society.
Research underscores how social media platforms facilitate hierarchical relationships that shape
much of the Internet as well as the rest of society (Fuchs, 2017). Case in point: In 2019 Facebook
announced political actors would be allowed to advertise falsehoods and therefore held to
different standards with regard to truth and speech norms than other users (Kreiss & McGregor,
2019). Asymmetries in how content is moderated as well as beliefs about social media platforms
may not only exacerbate perceptions on how the self and others are affected, but also shape
attitudes in favor of government regulation and/or content moderation.
Pew data from 2018 shows that 51% of Americans thought that “major technology companies
(…) should be regulated more than they are now” (Smith, 2018, p. 7). We want to illuminate
how different factors may impact regulation of social media platforms, including presumed
influence on self (PME1) and on others (PME3), political attitudes, attitudes toward platforms,
and demographic variables. To that end, we ask:
RQ2. What are the strongest predictors of support for government regulation of
platforms?
Methods
The data used in this study were collected through a cross-sectional U.S. national panel survey
conducted by the Digital Media Research Program at the University of Texas at Austin. The
survey was administered online using the survey software package Qualtrics. This study received
Institutional Review Board approval on January 30, 2019, and the survey data were collected in
March and April of the same year. Respondents were recruited by Dynata, an international
survey company that provides access to panels that represent the adult online population of the
United States.
Online panel data carry limitations, some of which we sought to overcome by implementing
quotas based on gender, age, and race/ethnicity to match the distribution of these characteristics
in the adult internet population in the United States as reported in December 2018 by the Pew
Research Center. Previous research has validated this technique (e.g., Bode et al., 2014; Kim &
Chen, 2015). The quota sampling process continued until subgroups (in our case, gender, age,
race/ethnicity, as well as Hispanic yes/no) were fully populated and reached their respective
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quotas. In total, 1,465 people responded to the survey (after sorting out unfinished cases), and
443 further cases were screened out or excluded for failing quality checks implemented in the
data collection process, such as speeding, straight-lining, or failed attention checks i. We
implemented rigorous rules for screen-outs that are in line with the Pew Research Center’s most
recent recommendations for identifying bogus survey takers (Kennedy et al., 2020). The final
respondents to the survey (N = 1,022) were slightly more female, less Hispanic, more educated
and wealthier than the U.S. internet population (see Table 1).
Table 1
Demographic Profile of the U.S. Survey and U.S. Census
Authors’ Study,
Pew Research Center,
U.S. Survey, March
U.S. Survey, December
2019
2018
(%)
(%)
Age:
18-29
23.3
25.0
30-49
38.4
36.0
50-64
26.5
26.0
65+
11.8
12.0
Gender:
Male
46.8
49.0
Female
53.2
51.0
Race/Ethnicity:
White
75.0
73.0
Black
11.4
12.0
Other
13.6
14.0
Hispanic:
Yes
5.8
15.0
Education:
High school or less
24.3
34.0
Some college
35.1
34.0
College+
40.6
32.0
Household Income:
Less than $30K
27.1
31.0
$30K-50K
17.7
18.0
$50K-75K
20.6
14.0
Greater than $75K
34.6
37.0

Variables of interest
Dependent variables related to regulation
Support for social media content moderation was operationalized by using and adapting
measures from Hoffner et al. (1999), originally conceived for censorship of television violence,
to social media platforms. Via Likert-type items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10
(strongly agree), we asked participants to rate three statements: “I support social media platforms
prohibiting the publishing of certain kinds of content,” “Platforms should have review systems
for all social media content before it is allowed to be published,” and “Platforms should have
review systems for all social media content after it is published” (n = 1,021, M = 6.23, SD =
2.26). These were used to form an index (α = .823).
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Support for government regulation was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the
statement “Government should regulate social media platforms more than they are regulated
now” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 4.92, SD = 2.77.
Perceived effects on self and others
Perceived effects of social media content on oneself builds on measures by Chen and Ng (2017).
This variable was operationalized using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very
much), prompting respondents to evaluate three statements: “How much do you think you are
influenced by content on social media platforms?,” “How much do you think social media
content leads you to be angry?,” and “How much do you think social media content leads you to
be upset?” These were averaged into an index, n = 1,017, M = 4.81, SD = 2.37, α = .855.
Perceived effects of social media content on others followed the same wording as the previous
variable, but instead of ‘you,’ the three items asked how ‘other adults’ were impacted by social
media content. This is in analogy to the dichotomy of ‘you’ vs. ‘other people’ used in TPE
research (e.g., Hoffner et al., 1999). The resulting index had good reliability, n = 1,018, M =
7.14, SD = 1.86, α = .882.
Perceived impact of social media platforms on self. On a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), respondents were prompted to evaluate the statement “The
impact that social media platforms and their products and services have had on me personally
has been more good than bad” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 5.23, SD = 2.452.
Perceived impact of social media platforms on society. On a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), respondents were prompted to evaluate the statement “The
impact that social media platforms have had on society has been more good than bad” (Smith,
2018), n = 1,022, M = 5.04, SD = 2.420.
Political attitudes
Partisanship was operationalized through a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (Strong
Republican) over 5 (Independent) to 10 (Strong Democrat), after the prompt: “Generally
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?”, n =
1,022, M = 6.34, SD = 3.04.
Opposition to censorship was operationalized using a subscale with good reliability (Alvarez &
Kemmelmeier, 2018). We used a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10
(strongly agree), for eight statements including “It is better to limit some violent or offensive
speech than to allow all of it” (reverse-coded), “All points of view, no matter how offensive,
should be allowed to be expressed in public (e.g., at rallies, public demonstrations, protests,
etc.),” or “If it causes severe distress on others, public speech should be heavily restricted”
(reverse-coded). Based on this, we formed an index, n = 1,021, M = 5.34, SD = 2.05, α = .888.
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Support for free speech was operationalized based on censorship measures used by Rojas, Shah
and Faber (1996). We used a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly
agree) for three statements: “No matter how controversial an idea is, an individual should be able
to express it publicly,” “Everybody should have full liberty of promoting what they believe to be
true,” and “All individuals should have the right to openly express their ideas, no matter how
prejudiced they might be,” for which we recoded one item before forming an index with
acceptable reliability, n = 1,022, M = 6.91, SD = 2.16, α = .860.
Platform attitudes
Perceived intentional censorship was operationalized using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the statements
“Social media platforms intentionally censor viewpoints,’ “The people working at social media
platforms intentionally censor viewpoints,” and “Algorithms at social media platforms
intentionally censor viewpoints” (Smith, 2018). These were averaged into an index, n = 1,020, M
= 6.10, SD = 2.20, α = .876.
Frequency of social media use was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (rarely/never) to 10 (often), which asked participants “How often do you use social media
sites?” (Correa et al., 2010), n = 1,018, M = 6.80, SD = 3.26.
Trust in social media platforms was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the
statement “I can trust social media platforms to do what is right” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M =
4.09, SD = 2.48.
Perceived ethical behavior of platforms was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the
statement “Social media platforms are ethical” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 4.70, SD = 2.35.
Demographics
We sought to control for four relevant demographic variables: age (M = 44.47, SD = 16.20),
gender, race, whether someone was Hispanic, and education (see Table 1 for demographics). All
variables except age were dummy-coded for subsequent analyses.
Results
In line with research on the third-person effect, H1 predicted that participants would perceive the
effects of social media content on others to be stronger than on themselves. We ran a paired t-test
and found a significant difference between effects on oneself (M = 4.81, SD = 2.37) and others
(M = 7.13, SD = 1.86); t(1016)=-28.380, p =.000. We used Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression to answer RQ1, which asked what the strongest predictors of support for social
media content review were. When all variables were entered in the full model, they accounted
for 40.7% of the variance in the dependent variable, support for social media content review
(R2Adjusted = .407, F(15, 996) = 47.262, p < .001). Based on standardized beta coefficients (Table
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2), we found that age (β = .098, p < .001), a higher level of education (β = .075, p < .05),
opposition to censorship (β = -.553, p < .001) and the perceived effects of social media content
on others (β = .161, p < .001) had significant effects on support for social media content review. ii
In the tradition of the diamond model, we follow Schmierbach et al.’s (2011) recommendation of
conducting a first regression with PME1 and PME3 as separate independent variables, and a
second regression with the self and other as a summative term for second-person perceptions.
While our results and the discussion section primarily focus on the first regression, we also
report results from the diamond model (R2Adjusted = .402, F(14, 997) = 49.603, p < .001) in Table
2.
Table 2
Support for social media content moderation hierarchical OLS regression
Model 1:
Perceived effects on self and
others as predictors
(Final model)
b
β
Demographics
Age
.014***
.098
(.004)
Gender (Male)
-.087
-.019
(.117)
Race (White)
.257
.049
(.135)
Hispanic (Non-hispanic)
.282
.029
(.241)
Education: Some college
.130
.027
(high school or less)
(.146)
Education: College plus
.348*
.075
(high school or less)
(.144)
Adjusted R2
4.2%
Political attitudes
Partisanship
.029
.039
(.020)
Opposition to censorship
-.612***
-.553
(.031)
Free speech support
.043
.041
(.028)
R2 Change
33.8%
Platform attitudes and use
Perceived intentional
-.005
-.005
censorship
(.028)
Frequency of social media
-.001
-.002
use
(.019)
Trust in platforms
-.011
-.012
(.033)
Perceived ethical
.060
.062
behavior of platforms
(.034)
R2 Change
0.3%
Perceived effects on self/other/
self+other
Perceived effects of social
.052
.055
media content on self
(.027)

Model 2:
Second-person perception as
predictor
(Final model)
b
β
.016***
(.004)
-.074
(.117)
.285*
(.136)
.303
(.242)
.134
(.146)
.352*
(.145)

.113
-.016
.055
.031
.028
.076
4.2%

.028
(.020)
-.620***
(.031)
.058*
(.028)

.037
-.560
.055
33.8%

.002
(.028)
-.003
(0.19)
-.024
(.032)
.046
(.034)

.002
-.004
-.026
.047
0.3%

-

-
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Perceived effects of social
.197***
.161
media content on
(.034)
others
Perceived effects of social
media content on
self+other
R2 Change
2.7%
Total adjusted R2
40.7%
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, n = 1,012.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

-

-

.112***
(.018)

.166

2.2%
40.2%

H2 predicted participants would perceive the beneficial effects of social media platforms to be
stronger on themselves than on society. A paired t-test between effects on oneself (M = 5.23, SD
= 2.45) and on society (M = 5.04, SD = 2.42) confirmed this hypothesis; t(2021)=-2.805, p =
.005.
OLS regression helped us answer RQ2, which examined the predictors of support for
government regulation of social media platforms. When all variables were entered into the full
model, they accounted for 16.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, support for social
media content review (R2Adjusted = .161, F(15, 1000) = 14.022, p < .001). In analogy to the
content-based regression, we also ran a regression for the summative term suggested by the
diamond model (R2Adjusted = .160, F(14, 1001) = 14.829, p < .001), reported in Table 3. The
standardized beta coefficients (Table 3) display effect sizes in relation to each other. In the first
regression with PME1 and PME3, we found that, among political attitudes, opposition to
censorship (β = -.231, p < .001) had a significant negative effect on support for government
regulation of platforms. Among platform attitudes, perceived intentional censorship (β = .251, p
< .001), frequency of social media use (β = -.187, p < .001), and trust in platforms (β =.188, p <
.001) had significant effects. Neither demographics nor PME1 or PME3 had significant effects.
Table 3
Support for platform regulation hierarchical OLS regression
Model 1:
Perceived effects on self and
society as predictors
(Final model)
b
β
Demographics
Age
.003
.017
(.005)
Gender (Male)
-.193
-.035
(.169)
Race (White)
.371
.058
(.196)
Hispanic (Non-hispanic)
-.654
-.055
(.349)
Education: Some college
-.291
-.050
(high school or less)
(.211)
Education: College plus
-.235
-.042
(high school or less)
(.209)
Adjusted R2
1.1%
Political attitudes
Partisanship
-.007
-.008

Model 2:
Second-person perception as
predictor
(Final model)
b
β
.003
(.005)
-.195
(.169)
.361
(.196)
-.642
(.350)
-.283
(.211)
-.230
(.209)

.015
-.035
.057
-.054
-.049
-.041
1.7%

-.006

-.006
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Opposition to censorship
Free speech support
R2 Change
Platform attitudes and use
Perceived intentional
censorship
Frequency of social media
use
Trust in platforms

(.028)
-.311***
(.044)
.020
(.041)

-.231
.016

(.028)
-.309***
(.044)
.011
(.040)

6.3%
.317***
(.039)
-.159***
(.028)
.209***
(.049)
.005
(.051)

.251
-.187
.188

Perceived ethical
.004
behavior of platforms
R2 Change
9.2%
Perceived effects on self/society/
self+society
Perceived effects of
.051
.045
platforms on self
(.045)
Perceived effects of
-.071
-.062
platforms on society
(.048)
Perceived effects of
platforms on
self+society
R2 Change
0.2%
Total adjusted R2
16.1%
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, n = 1,016.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

-.229
.008
6.3%

.322***
(.039)
-.154***
(.028)
.202***
(.049)
.005
(.051)

.256
-.181
.182
.004
9.2%

-

-

-

-

-.008
(.025)

-.012

0.0%
16.0%

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to measure public attitudes regarding two important forms of
social media regulation in society: content moderation through social media platforms and
government regulation of social media platforms. We explored presumed negative effects of
social media content on self and others and presumed beneficial effects of platforms on society
and on the self, as well as how both perceptions relate to support for content moderation and
platform regulation, respectively. We identified third-person perceptions regarding the presumed
negative effects of social media content, and first-person perceptions regarding the presumed
positive effects of platforms on society.
In our model, significant predictors of support for social media content moderation included age,
education, opposition to censorship, and perceived effects of social media content on others
(PME3). It stands to reason that opposition to censorship surfaces as a strong negative predictor
of support for content moderation. Research has documented severe concerns about freedom of
expression in light of content moderation (Ballard, 2019). When someone is fundamentally
opposed to censorship, their opposition appears to extend into the realm of moderation. Our
study aligns with what scholarship on PME1 and PME3 predicts (Chung & Moon, 2016). In the
domain of social media content and its moderation, we find that PME3 significantly impacts
support for moderation, while PME1 does not. When additionally consulting the diamond
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method, we found a significant effect of the summative term of PME1 + PME3 on support for
moderation.
Moving on to support for government regulation of platforms, we found a first-person
perception: The perceived beneficial effects of social media platforms were significantly stronger
on oneself than on society. Research suggests that first-person perceptions may occur in the
context of desirable content (Golan & Day, 2008). Our research extends the applicability of a
first-person perspective to communicative infrastructures – social media platforms. We can only
speculate why that might be the case. The imagined affordances of platforms (Nagy & Neff,
2015) may be easier to conceptualize on a personal level that is rooted in one’s own experience
of platforms vis-à-vis the abstract notion of beneficial effects of platforms on society. While we
did not measure underlying psychological mechanisms, the proposition that self-enhancement
(Meirick, 2005) may be governing how the benefits of social media platforms were felt more
strongly for the self than for society provides a compelling possible explanation.
The full regression model analyzing support for government regulation of platforms did not find
significant effects of PME1 or PME3 on support for government regulation of platforms. It is
possible that the imaginable larger benefits of platforms are difficult to conceptualize after all, so
much so that an articulation of support for regulation becomes tricky. Via the diamond model,
we also did not find significant effects of the summative term of PME1 and PME3 on support for
regulation.
Like in the content moderation model, the main regression on platform regulation surfaced
opposition to censorship as a strong negative predictor. However, perceived intentional
censorship had a strong positive effect. This is noteworthy: When users think that platforms are
intentionally censoring viewpoints, they are more supportive of government regulation. Shifts in
public sentiment about how social media companies regulate content may be conducive to
increased future support for government intervention in and regulation of technology companies.
Our results highlight the importance of attitudinal research about the role of social media
platforms in society, particularly about what users think are possible harms and benefits of social
media content and platforms. Platform operators and lawmakers must take seriously the
constituents of platforms when setting up regimes of governance so that proportionality of
measures is maintained. Studies such as ours help gauge public opinion on how to understand the
powers and impact of social media platforms – knowledge which, as we argue, is critical in
shaping and defining policy.
This study expands research on the third-person effect by confirming the predictive power of
PME3 for the behavioral variable of support for content moderation, but not for support for
platform regulation. This is mirrored by results from the diamond model. We identify thirdperson perceptions with regard to the impact of social media content, and first-person
perceptions with regard to the impact of platforms writ large, thus extending the applicability of
research on first-person perceptions from content toward infrastructures such as social media
platforms.
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Limitations
This study is not without limitations. The survey design prohibited us from exploring further the
motivations for specific perceptions. Furthermore, as a cross-sectional study, we cannot make
conclusive statements about causal relations. Measuring perceptions toward regulation of and by
platforms was conducted with items about the negative impact of content on ‘you’ vs. ‘other
people,’ and about the positive impact of platforms on ‘me personally’ vs. ‘society.’ While
differences in measurement are tied to how the survey study was conducted, the lack of parallel
measurements posits a limitation to our study. Within the domain of TPP and FPP, measures
typically distinguish between other individuals and the self, rather than between other individuals
and society. This conceptual nuance was not maintained in our measures. We acknowledge this
as a limitation to our study and invite future researchers to test these relationships with updated
sets of items. We included the summative term of effects on others and self in the spirit of
Schmierbach et al. (2011) for future research with a particular emphasis on second-person
perceptions (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002) to engage with. Exemplary research on the diamond
method includes Sun, Shen and Pan’s (2008) work which can be helpful in mapping paths
forward for more research in this area.
In lieu of more sophisticated models (e.g., on interrelationships between frequency of social
media use, exposure to negative content, and first-person perceptions), we opted for
parsimonious models aimed at our primary research questions and hypotheses. While the use of
single-item measures is not preferred from a psychometric standpoint, regardless of their face
validity, in this study it allowed for the inclusion of a variety of measures in a large-scale survey
(Scherr, 2018). We suggest future research to test and develop multiple-item scales alongside our
single-item measures (Fuchs and Diamantopoulos, 2009).
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Endnotes
i

A relatively high rate of screen-outs can be explained by both our conservative quality criteria to protect the
integrity of the collected dataset, as well as the length of the survey. Beyond what is reported, the survey also
included dimensions on fake news, representation, (social) media and journalism. We carefully designed and
pretested the questionnaire to avoid potential response bias. Few to no topically similar questions were asked prior
to the ones used in this study, with the intent to avoid question order effects.
ii
While we limited our analytical inquiry to PME3, PME1, and the effect of their summative term as suggested by
the diamond method, we also calculated TPPs and entered them into the regression model. Neither in the content
moderation nor the platform regulation model did TPP have a significant effect on the behavioral variables of
support for regulation.
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